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The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLUIPA Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle1For the past twenty years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith2has been the bete noir of the religious liberty community in America.  The widespread and conventional account of Smith is that, by precluding claims of mandatory religious exemptionfrom formally neutral and generally applicable laws, the decision radically diminished religiousfreedom.   For example, prior to the decision in Smith, a religiously motivated person or a3religious entity would have had a strong argument that a law outlawing all human consumptionof alcohol was unconstitutional as applied to the use of wine in religious sacraments  – in otherwords, that an exemption for sacramental use of wine was mandated by the Free Exercise Clauseof the First Amendment.   After Smith, such an argument would be unavailable to anyone4contesting the application of such a law, even in the obvious examples of using wine in ChristianCommunion, or in Jewish celebration of the Passover holiday.
  The authors are both on the law faculty of The George Washington University.  Ira C.1Lupu is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is Professor of Lawand the Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion.  This essay is part of a larger book project,tentatively titled “Secular Government, Religious People.” For the title of this essay, weacknowledge our debt to Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev.353 (1978) (emphasizing the role of proofs, arguments, and rationality in the enterprise ofadjudication). 494 U.S. 872 (1990).2 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.3 The Volstead Act, implementing National Prohibition, exempted the use of wine for4sacramental purposes. 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed 49 Stat. 872 (1935).  This exemption was, inour terms, a constitutionally permissive rather than a constitutionally mandatory accommodation. Part II of this article discusses the appropriate parameters of permissive accommodations ofreligion. 1
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To many critics, Smith indefensibly rendered the Free Exercise Clause constitutionallyredundant or superfluous.  From their narrow angle of vision, the critics have a point.  For overhalf a century, the Clause has overlapped with other, broader constitutional concerns of libertyand equality.  For considerably fewer years, the Clause appeared to have a strong independentforce, and Smith weakened that force.  The weakening effect was far less than is typicallyasserted, because the Supreme Court had substantially undercut the independent force of theClause in the decade leading up to Smith.   Nevertheless, Smith has had a very real effect on the5law of free exercise, and on the general perception of that law among lawyers, judges, andconcerned citizens. So the critics are not entirely wrong, but they are myopic.  Our view is historically longer,and considerably more panoramic in scope.  The Free Exercise Clause has been deeply importantin the development of constitutional rights to religious freedom.  Moreover, it has quitefrequently functioned in ways that pull along with it other, analogous secular rights.  BecauseAmerican law and culture have great respect for religious freedom, it has turned out to be one ofthe very best friends of freedom generally.  Through this wider lens, we analyze in Part I below the regime of religious liberty thathas developed in the U.S. over the past century or so.  That regime is robust indeed, and it
 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Bob Jones University v. United States, 4615U.S. 574 (1983); Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bowen v. Roy,476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); O'Lone v. Estate ofShabazz,, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.439 (1988); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. ofEqualization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). These decisions are sorted and canvassed in Ira C. Lupu, OfTime and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L.Rev. 171, 177-185 (1995) 2
protects strenuously – though not perfectly – the rights of the people to maintain their ownchoices of religious experience.  That regime is limited, however, by restraints that flow from thegovernment’s secular character, and the disabilities that flow from that character.At the periphery of that regime of religious liberty is the distinct problem of the creationof religious exemptions from otherwise general laws, such as a prohibition on drug or alcoholconsumption.  Focusing primarily on a case study of the Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act,  Part II of this paper analyzes the ways in which the legal system may properly6respond to demands for such accommodations and exemptions.  In that analysis, thegovernment’s obligatory secular character plays a central role in specifying the forms and limitsof governmental actions designed to accommodate religious freedom.I.  The Mandatory Regime of Religious LibertyFor most Americans, the core of religious liberty is reflected in a set of key principles:1.  The right to worship as one chooses;2.  The right to prepare and disseminate writings that contain materials for religiouscontemplation and worship;3.  The right to assemble with others for purpose of worship;4. The right to proselytize to others about one’s religious convictions;5.  The right to be free of compulsion to worship in ways contrary to one’s own beliefs;6.  The right of parents and guardians of children to direct and control the religious upbringing ofchildren in their custody;7.  The right of religious sects and denominations to be treated equally with others under the law.
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.6 3
When we focus on the history and status of these core principles, three phenomena arestriking.  First, all of these rights are extremely well-protected in American constitutional law. Second, the development of these rights has unfolded through a conceptual strategy of protectinganalogous secular concerns – freedom of speech, press, and association;  parental rights; and theequality rights of unpopular social groups – along with their religious counterparts.  Third, ourconstitutional history reveals that religiously motivated claims have frequently been at the cuttingedge of constitutional freedoms, and have pulled analogous secular claims along in their wake,though secular conceptions of freedom have more recently been in the position of that leadingedge. Examples of all three phenomena, both hoary and recent, are plentiful:1. The Supreme Court first protected the right to proselytize to strangers with respect toany form of social cause in Lovell v. Griffin,  Cantwell v. Connecticut,  and Murdock v.7 8Pennsylvania,  all of which involved distribution of religious literature by members of the9Jehovah’s Witnesses. More recent decisions make explicit what was clear from the outset – thatthe right of proselytizing door-to-door or in the streets is not limited to efforts at religious
 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating requirement that any distributor of literature obtain a7permit from city official with standardless discretion to grant or deny). 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding the Free Exercise Clause applicable to the states by8incorporation into the 14  Amendment, and invalidating a conviction for common law breach ofththe peace by street proselytizer who played phonograph record attacking the Roman CatholicChurch) . 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating fee for a license to distribute literature as a forbidden9flat tax on the exercise of religion). 4
persuasion.102. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,  the Supreme Court rejected a Free Exercise11Clause claim to exempt religiously motivated children from an otherwise enforceable generalduty to salute the American flag. Just three years later, in the midst of war, the Court in WestVirginia Board of Education v. Barnette  upheld a general right to refuse to utter state-12compelled speech. Barnette involved the identical religiously motivated refusal of schoolchildren to salute the American flag as had Gobitis, but the Barnette opinion rests on general,religion-neutral grounds. 3.  In the famous footnote four to the Court’s opinion in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,  the concern for religious minorities is the first listed example of the need for13courts to protect “discrete and insular minorities” from unfriendly legislation directed againstthem as a result of prejudice.   Religious minorities are typically protected under the Religion14
 See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (political canvassing by10candidate for office); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (labor union canvassing). 310 U.S. 586 (1940).11 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).12 304 U.S. 144 (1938).13 “Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes14directed at particular religious . . . or national… or racial minorities …: whether prejudice againstdiscrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail theoperation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and whichmay call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” Id. at 152, note 4 (citationsomitted).  See also Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the SmithDecision May Be A Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. XXX (2011) at[text at note 65] (describing arguments that “religion is in fact the generative source of modernsubstantive commitments to human equality”). 5
Clauses,  while racial and national minorities are typically protected under the Equal Protection15Clause,  but the underlying theories of judicial intervention overlap considerably.164.  The germinal decisions protecting the right of parents to direct and control the flow ofknowledge in their children’s education explicitly involve religious entities.  In Meyer v.Nebraska (1923),  the Court invalidated a Nebraska law outlawing instruction in modern foreign17languages prior to the eighth grade; Meyer was a teacher of the German language in a Lutheranparochial school.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925),  the Court struck down an Oregon18compulsory education law which required minor children to attend public school; the plaintiffswere a private military academy, and the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,a religious order that operated a parochial school.  Later decisions have recognized such parentalrights in wholly secular settings.  195.  The potential pull-force of religious liberty on liberty more generally continues to the
  See  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).15 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating de jure racial16segregation in public schools); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (protecting Mexican-Americans against discrimination in jury selection). 262 U.S. 390 (1923).17 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  18 In Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927),  the Court applied the parental rights19doctrine to a Hawaiian Territorial law which outlawed “foreign language schools;” Hawaiians ofJapanese, Chinese, and Korean descent operated such schools in order to teach their language andancestral culture to their children.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)  extends this themein an opinion that appears to rest on the free exercise clause alone, but Smith re-rationalizedYoder as a case involving hybrid rights of religious and parental freedom, 494 U.S. at 881, andmore recent cases protect parental rights in a wholly secular context.  See, e.g., Troxel v.Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating law that required custodial parents to permit childvisitation by grandparents). [ADD CITES TO DWYER AND HILL IN THIS SYMPOSIUM]6
present day.  As of this writing, the Supreme Court has under advisement the case of Snyder v.Phelps,  in which the father of a soldier killed in Iraq successfully sued religiously-motivated20protestors for intentional infliction of emotional distress, by way of anti-gay messages displayednear the soldier’s funeral.  The case will clarify the appropriate constitutional standard to beapplied to speech on public issues – whether the speech is religiously motivated or otherwise –that inflicts emotional distress on a private figure.21More recently, religious liberty has moved from the work-horse position to that of thebeneficiary in cases where the affirmation of some rights leads to recognition of others.  Forexample, the rich development of the law of access to public fora for speech has helped pullreligious speech into various publicly-supported contexts from which it had been excluded.  22And the growth of the right of association, embraced in cases like Boy Scouts of America v.Dale,  similarly has been fruitful for claims of religious association.   23 24As revealed by this account of reciprocal influences, religious liberty and other forms of
 580 F.3d 206 (4  Cir. 2010), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010) (No. 09-751).  The20 thSupreme Court heard argument in the case on October 6, 2010. Hustler, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) established the relevant standard in cases21involving infliction of emotional distress on a public figure.  In Falwell, the plaintiff was a well-known religious leader, and the defendant’s speech did not appear to be religiously motivated. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 22622(1990); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford CentralSchool, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 530 U.S. 640 (2000).23 Dale has buttressed claims by religious entities with respect to claims of exemption24from employment laws.  See Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008); Univ. ofGreat Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (DC Cir. 2002).7
liberty have for nearly a century exerted a considerable influence, frequently salutary, on oneanother.  The core principles of religious liberty have thus become protected by a broad variety ofnorms that connect religious freedom to expressive liberty, associational liberty, parentalfreedom, and constitutional norms of equality.  When the Supreme Court in EmploymentDivision v. Smith refers to a “hybrid situation” of rights,  the reference is precisely to this proud25and exact jurisprudential tradition, rather than to some elusive and seemingly arbitrary newtrigger for  protecting religious freedom only when it is conjoined with some element (howeverflimsy) of other constitutionally protected concerns.26The reasons why our constitutional tradition has developed in this way are deep andsignificant.  The secular claims that are analogous to the protected religious claims – forexample, the secular right to proselytize for political and social causes – have constitutional force equal to and independent from that presented by assertions of religious rights.  To put the pointfrom the other direction, the law has quite rightly developed in ways that refuse to privilegereligious speakers, associations, parents, or conscientious objectors  over their non-religious27counterparts.28
 494 U.S. 872, 882.25 For decisions (rendered soon after Smith) rejecting or ignoring the hybrid rights theory26as a workable mechanism for protecting new free exercise claims, see Kissinger v. Bd. ofTrustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6  Cir. 1993); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, 68 F.3dth525, 539 (1  Cir, 1995).  st This phenomenon is especially visible in the context of statutory exemptions for27conscientious objectors from military conscription.  United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 613(1965); United State v. Welsh, 308 U.S. 333 (1970). The earliest post-Smith account of this phenomenon is William P. Marshall, In Defense28of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991).  This theme is8
We want to focus on another, perhaps less obvious, but equally important set of reasonswhy religion-based rights tend quickly or immediately to become assimilated with their secularanalogues.  Although many of the doctrines that protect religious liberty first appeared in asetting where the claimants were religiously-motivated and raised religion-specific objections,the resulting legal norms do not require courts or other institutions to evaluate questions ofreligiosity.  Such questions might include whether the claim truly has a religious character,  or29whether the belief underlying the claim is held with religious sincerity.   Far more30problematically, these questions might also include whether the claim has deep or shallowsignificance to individuals or a faith community – that is, whether the religious practice at issueis central or peripheral, obligatory or customary, subject to rewards or pains in the hereafter, andso on. At the heart of our argument – both here and in the larger work of which this is a part – isthe proposition that such evaluations of religious claims qua religious claims are beyond thecompetence of government.  By this we do not mean that such evaluation is beyond thecompetence of human judgment; instead, we refer to the constitutional competence of agovernment limited to matters of temporal and secular concern.  Any such appraisals are subject
reinforced in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. XXX, 130 S. Ct. 2971(2010), inwhich the Court rejected a claim by a religious group of law students that its rights to freedom ofassociation entitled it to ignore restrictions on exclusions from membership, applicable equally toall student groups at the law school.  As the Court saw the problem, the claim in Martinez wasone of religious privilege, not associational equality. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3  Cir. 1981) (holding that MOVE is not a29 rdreligion, so its “Naturalist Minister” is not entitled to special diet in prison). U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).30 9
to significant Establishment Clause restraints.31This idea is far from new; indeed, it has been embedded in our law for many decades.  Incases involving disputes over church property,  and in disputes over the employment status of32clergy,  courts have long been explicit about the constitutional necessity of judicial abstention33from questions that involve evaluations of religious commitments, obligations, andperformances.  This “hands-off” doctrine is sometimes attributed to the Free Exercise Clause,34and sometimes (as we prefer) to the Establishment Clause.   Without regard to that Clause-35focused question, courts have repeatedly and consistently ruled that agents of the state lack
 The prohibition on “excessive government entanglement with religion,” Walz v. Tax31Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), does not really capture this concern because the adjectiveexcessive suggests that the concern is one of degree.  Id.  The prohibition on state exercise ofreligious authority, however, is a matter of kind, not a matter of degree. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth32Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. (13Wall.) 679 (1871).  See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement inConflicts Over Religious Property, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1843  (1998). See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).  Almost every33Circuit Court has followed McClure, and none have rejected its approach.  See Ira C. Lupu &Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutionsand their Leaders, & Georgetown J. L & Pub. Pol. 119, 123-128 (2009).  Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of34Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. Rev.1633. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pielach v.35Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (Mass. 1996) (invalidating on EstablishmentClause grounds a statute requiring employers to accommodate employee practices “of [a] creedor religion as required by that creed or religion”).  See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and their Leaders, &Georgetown J. L & Pub. Pol. 119, 123-128 (2009). Professor Garnett attributes the doctrine toboth Clauses.  See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?  Toward an InstitutionalUnderstanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 273  (2008).10
authority to decide questions such as who is qualified for ministry, or which faction is morefaithful to the original teachings of the church.How do these two powerful and persistent themes – the tendency to generalize back andforth between religious liberty and its secular analogues, and the requirement of state abstentionfrom deciding questions of religious significance – animate both the general enterprise ofreligious accommodation,  and the particulars of the decision and reasoning in Smith?  First,these themes remind us that claims to free exercise exemptions were, as a historical matter, at theperiphery of religious liberty, perhaps because at the Founding the primary locus of concern wasa form of Protestant religious liberty.  In that religious tradition, beliefs and forms of worshipwere central; in those situations in which religious practices were of special importance, such asthe observance of a Sunday Sabbath, the relevant customs tended to be widely shared and henceroutinely protected in the law.  In such a world, religious exemptions from general duties wouldrarely if ever seem necessary.   36In contemporary America, the combination of wide-ranging religious pluralism,extending far beyond Protestant Christianity, and the far-reaching expansion of government havecreated many more occasions for conflict between religious practice and government policy. Accordingly, the conventional boundaries of religious liberty claims have moved outward from
 Saturday Sabbatarians occasionally presented such a problem, even at the time of the36Framing.  See Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793).  And the question of Sunday maildelivery generated a significant conflict in the early American Republic.  See the discussion of the “Sunday Mail Controversy” in Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C.Berg, Religion and the Constitution (Aspen, 2d ed., 2006), at 70.  For rather different views ofthe broader historical record with regard to accommodations, compare Philip Hamburger, AConstitutional Right of Religious Exemption -- An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 915 (1992) with Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of FreeExercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1410 (1990).11
the core of belief and worship to a periphery of uncommon religious practices,  and new37assertions of conscientious objections in matters of sexuality and reproduction.   Of course, from38the perspective of those who make practice-related claims, they may be anything but marginal orperipheral.  Such claims (about appearance, diet, particular days for worship, use of mind-altering substances as a sacrament, refusal to provide particular medical services, etc.) may bequite central to the religious lives of those who assert them.  The intensity of religiouscommitments to such beliefs and practices is precisely why the ruling in Smith has produced a firestorm over the past two decades.The state’s interest in regulating these matters, however, typically emerges from secularconcerns that do not involve the government in exercising religious voice, judgment, authority,
 For example, intensive security screening for passengers traveling by air has set off a37whole new round of concern about interference with religious garb and intrusions on religiousconceptions of privacy by the U.S. Transportation Security Agency .  See Tara Bahrampour, TSAscanners, Pat-downs Particularly Vexing for Muslims, other Religious Groups, Washington Post,December 23, 2010, available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/22/AR2010122202919.html. In a variety of contexts, persons and organizations have sought rights to object on38religious  grounds to facilitating abortions, see, e.g., Illinois Health Care Right of ConscienceAct, 745 Ill. Compiled Stats. 70/1 (1998) (protecting health care personnel and facilities fromliabilities or other detriments based on their refusal to participate in delivering health careservices for reasons of conscience); adoptions by same-sex couples, see Robin Fretwell Wilson,A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L 475(2008); same-sex weddings, see examples collected in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, SameSex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J. Law & Soc. Pol. 274, nn. 7-11 (2010); andfertility treatments for same-sex couples, see North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc.v.Benitez, 44 Cal. 4th 1145, 189 P.2d 959 (Cal. 2008) (holding that religious freedom rights ofdoctors do not provide grounds for exemption from duty to treat for infertility a woman in alesbian couple). 12
or character.   From the government’s perspective, exemption claims are at the conceptual39margin of intersection with government authority over the subject of religion. Moreover, thesecular analogues of many such exemption claims – for example, those involving use of mind-altering substances, or modes of dress – do not involve constitutionally protected activity.  As aresult, the constitutional strategy of protecting both religion and its secular analogues by findingtheir common, constitutionally privileged elements is not available.  In such cases, the demandfor accommodation is frequently limited to religiously motivated practice alone.What renders some practice-related demands for religious accommodations constitutionally insoluble are institutional arrangements that require the government to evaluatethe religious significance and impact of government policy.  Of course, religion is a category ofactivity identified by the Constitution itself, as well as a variety of statutory schemes,  so40determinations by government agents of what constitutes religious activity are inevitable.  Thetruly problematic judgments are thus not about whether activity is religious, or whether theactivity has been burdened in some legal sense.   Rather, the questions that are jurisdictionally41
 In cases where the state’s interest does involve religious judgment, the Smith rule does39not apply, and the practices are protected against hostile state regulation.  Church of the LukumiBabalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for example, authorizes tax exempt40status for entities organized for charitable, religious, educational, scientific, and literary purposes,among others.  See Church of the Chosen People v. U.S., 548 F.Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1982)(upholding IRS decision that the church did not qualify as “religious” under § 501(c)(3) of theInternal Revenue Code). For analysis of what should count as a legally cognizable burden, see Ira C. Lupu,41Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L.Rev. 933 (1989) (identifying legal coercion, discrimination, loss of entitlements, and interferencewith legally protected interests as qualitative measures of what should qualify as a burden).13
off-limits for the state are those involving the substantiality of the burden, or (to put it anotherway) the religious impact of being denied the freedom to engage in religiously-motivatedbehavior.  The hazards of such determinations are multi-fold, and were repeatedly exhibited in theSupreme Court’s pre-Smith decisions. These dangers include favoritism and official approval forsome faiths, and inevitable disapproval of others.   In Wisconsin v. Yoder,  for example, Chief42 43Justice Burger’s opinion commended at length the simple virtues of the way of life pursued bythe Old Order Amish,  and the likely impact on those virtues if Amish children were obliged to44remain in school until age 16.   In dissent, Justice Douglas wondered how other religious45denominations, including his own, would fare under such a judicial appraisal of their record forvirtue.   In the wake of Yoder, lower courts found themselves measuring education-related46claims by families in other Christian denominations by standards that focused on the content oftheir religious beliefs, the role of those beliefs in their way of life, and the durability of the beliefs
 See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that IRS42may treat some religious beliefs on race relations as contrary to public policy and thereforeundeserving of tax-exempt status).   406 U.S. 205 (1972).43 Id. at 209-212; 216-217.44 Id. at 210-213; 218-219.45 Id. at 246 (“I am not at all sure how the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists,46Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Unitarians, and my own Presbyterians would make out if subjected tosuch a test.”) 14
and life patterns in the face of compulsory education laws.   A jurisprudence that propels judges47into evaluation of such questions is a contra-constitutional excursion into appraising theologicalquestions, as well as an exercise in amateur sociology.48Moreover, such official determinations present an unusually high risk of arbitrarinesswith respect to decisions as to whether a particular religious practice is not only significant initself, but important enough to deserve an offset against competing state interests.   In Smith, for49example, the dissenting opinion focused – in part, in expressly theological terms – on the harmimposed on the Native American Church and its members by the state’s ban on peyote.  50Although Justice O’Connor agreed about this appraisal of religious harm, she concurred in theresult because she believed that the state’s anti-drug interests were sufficient to justify suchdamage to the Native American Church.   51The problem of state appraisal of harms to religious experience is aggravated still further
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Community Board of Educ., 368 N.W. 2d 74, 83-8447(Iowa, 1985) (holding that fundamentalist Baptist parochial school is not entitled to a statutory orconstitutional  exemption from state accreditation standards because, inter alia, “exposure to themore general American culture [does not] pose such an immediate threat to plaintiffs’ mode ofliving as is the case with the Amish.”) Id. at 84. It is quite different for scholars to speculate on the relationship between the state’s law48and the survival of the cultural commitments of religious communities.  See, e.g., Robert Cover,The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1989). Native Americans are still waiting for any such judgments to run in their favor. See49Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 494 U.S. at 913-916 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).50 Id. at 903-906 (O’Connor, J., concurring).51 15
by the rule in Thomas v. Review Board  that individuals are free to assert the content and52intensity of their own religious convictions, without regard for the views of others in theirreligious community.   The substantiality of a burden thus may depend on a judicial appraisal 53– psychological rather than sociological – of each litigant’s subjective religious experience.  Anadjudicative process that includes such determinations breaches the divide that separates thesecular state from the constitutionally separate functions of religious communities as interpretersof their own traditions. The outcome in Smith is thus justifiable on the primary ground that government agentsare constitutionally incompetent to decide such questions, because of the absence ofconstitutionally acceptable standards to do so.   And the Court’s opinion in Smith rests explicitly54on such grounds: “Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts mustnot presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of areligious claim.”55
 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 52 In keeping with Thomas, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Pielach v.53Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. 668 N.E.2d 1298 (MA 1996), invalidated a state statute whichrequired employers to accommodate employee practices “of [a[ creed or religion as required bythat religion,” because the statute set up conflicts, to be resolved by the courts, betweenindividual adherents to a faith and “experts” or other official spokespersons for that faithtradition. The analogy between this theme and the doctrine of political questions, which54precludes decision of certain constitutional issues because of “a lack of judicially discoverableand manageable standards for resolving” them, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962),should be quite evident.  See also Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court At Its Word: TheImplications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 5 (1995). 494 U.S. at 886-887 (citing cases concerning unemployment compensation, church55property, and criminal fraud), and 887, n. 4.  See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery16
Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisional law since Smith has undermined the long-standing constraint on judicial evaluation of  “the place of a particular belief in a religion.”  InChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,  the Court upheld a free exercise claim56against local ordinances that had singled out for prohibition the practice of ritual sacrifice ofanimals.  The case did not require any evaluation of the religious significance of the practice; adetermination that the Church and its followers had been the victims of targeted discrimination inthe crafting of animal cruelty laws was sufficient for a unanimous Court to find a violation of theFree Exercise Clause.  Nor does the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao doVegetal  represent a step backward from Smith’s prohibition on evaluating the religious57significance of a practice.  The unanimous opinion in O Centro upheld a religious community’sclaim for an exemption, required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, from the ControlledSubstance Act’s prohibition on importation of hoasca tea, which the religious group used in itssacraments.  As elaborated in Part II below, the most serious constitutional problem of RFRA isthe requirement that government decision-makers determine what constitutes a “substantialburden” on religious freedom, but the government did not dispute that point in the O Centrolitigation.  Rather, the result in O Centro rested on the government’s inability to demonstrate that
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988) (courts are not competent to decide which beliefsand practices are central or indispensable to a particular religious faith). 508 U.S. 520 (1993).56 546 U.S. 418 (2006).57 17
the exemption threatened its interests in public health or the interdiction of drug trafficking.  58Moreover, the question of government competence to decide questions of religious significance did not arise in Cutter v. Wilkinson,  which upheld on their face the “institutionalized persons”59provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, but did not purport toevaluate the burden on religious freedom with respect to any particular practice.As we develop further in Part II, our argument about government competence to decidequestions of religious significance is not an assertion of a special disability of the judicial branch. Unlike Justice Scalia in Smith,  we are not contending that this concern is about the separation60of judicial from legislative or executive power.  Rather, the relevant constitutional disabilityattaches to all branches and all levels of government.  In this constitutional context, separation ofpowers means separating the functions of the secular state from those that are unique anddistinctive to religious communities and their members.  61The implications of this position, rooted in the Establishment Clause, are sweeping, butthey are hardly devastating to the cause of religious liberty.  As analyzed above, courts canrecognize mandatory aspects of religious freedom by finding common elements between
 Id. at 430-437.58 544 U.S. 709 (2005).59 494 U.S. at 890 (suggesting that claimants seek legislative rather than judicial60accommodations for religious practices). Without elaborating the point, the late John Hart Ely described the Establishment61Clause in precisely these terms.  John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard Univ. Press,1980), at 94 (“The First Amendment’s religious clauses . . . make sure the church and thegovernment [give] each other breathing space: the provision thus performs a structural orseparation of powers function.”) 18
religious liberty and its secular analogues.  Doing so requires no judicial appraisal of issues ofreligious impact or weight.  Similarly, the other branches of government can structureaccommodations in ways that do not require discretionary appraisals of questions of religioussignificance.  Many accommodations are free of such defects, but others are not.  It is to theforms and limits of such permissive regimes of accommodation that we now turn.II.  Permissive Modes of Religious Accommodation – and their LimitsFor virtually the entire history of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, theSupreme Court has recognized that government has the power to accommodate religion, subjectto certain limits.   Those who defend programs challenged under the Establishment Clause have62regularly claimed that the program represents accommodation, rather than unconstitutionalsupport or promotion, of religion.   The easiest cases for the government to defend are those in63which the challenged program offers the same protection to religion and its secular analogues.  64
 See, e.g., Zorach v Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (released time program is a62permissible accommodation of religious needs).  We have extended discussions of these limits inIra C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy andthe Establishment Clause, 110 W.Va. L. Rev. 87, 106-111 (2007); and Ira C. Lupu and RobertTuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation and Acknowledgment of Religion and PublicUniversities, 17 W&M Bill of Rts. J. 938, 966-980 (2008). Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732-33, 743-47 (1994) (Scalia, J.,63dissenting) (arguing that Court should have found that school district created for OrthodoxJewish community was a permissible accommodation of religious needs).  See also School Dist.of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-305 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (state-sponsored prayer in public school is not a permissible accommodation of schoolchildren’sreligious interest in prayer during the school day).  But see id at 311-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting)(arguing that school-sponsored prayer is a permissible accommodation of religion). See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (rejecting Establishment Clause64challenge to property tax exemption for religious organizations, because the exemptions weregranted to a wide range of non-profit organizations, both secular and religious).19
Accommodations that single out religion for special protection, however, are somewhat morevulnerable to challenge.65The Court has generally applied three criteria to determine whether a program of thatcharacter is a permissible accommodation of religion.  First, the accommodation must respond toa distinctive burden on religion.   Second, the accommodation must be available on a religion-66neutral basis.   And third, the accommodation must not impose unreasonable burdens on third67parties.68
 See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (sales tax exemption limited to65religious publications violates the Establishment Clause). Thus, in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court rejected the state’s66claim that a tax exemption for religious publications was a reasonable accommodation.  TheCourt reasoned that equal liability for taxes does not distinctively burden religion, so the benefitwas an unconstitutional subsidy. Id. at 17-19.  The “parsonage exemption” in the InternalRevenue Code § 107 suffers from the same defect, and faces a strong constitutional challenge ina case now pending in federal district court.  See Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Geithner,715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. CA 2010). If an accommodation is not available to all similarly burdened religious groups or67individuals, the accommodation may be treated as support for the uniquely protected faith group.Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-05 (1994) (school district created forOrthodox Jewish community was unconstitutional because the accommodation was not generallyavailable to all faith groups).  But see id. at 745-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Courtinappropriately assumed that the state would act unconstitutionally if faced with a similarreligious community’s request for such an accommodation). Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (categorical duty of employers to68accommodate employees’ Sabbath observance violates the Establishment Clause because of theburden imposed on employers and fellow employees).  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709(2005), which rejected a facial challenge to the constitutionality of RLUIPA, based on theassumption that courts applying RLUIPA will give due regard to concern for the safety ofcorrectional officials and other inmates.  Id. at 722-26. This third criteria reflects a concern aboutsubordination of other private interests to the accommodated religious practice, and thus requiressome measure of equal regard for religious and non-religious interests.  See also TWA v.Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (the duty of employers to accommodate religious needs ofemployees is limited to accommodations that impose no more than a de minimis burden on the20
These three criteria, however, do not exhaust the Establishment Clause’s restrictions onpermissive accommodation, because they reflect only one category of the Clause’s concern –government support or promotion of religion.  As we explained above, the Establishment Clausealso limits the state’s assertion of religious authority.  The state is not jurisdictionally competentto make religious decisions, such as the most faithful interpretation of religious texts, the fitnessof a person for religious ministry, or the relative religious significance of particular beliefs orconduct.   Although the Court has articulated fairly stable criteria for deciding whether a69permissive accommodation unconstitutionally promotes religion, it has not developed similarstandards for assessing whether a permissive accommodation requires government officials toexercise religious authority.  In what follows, we offer a tentative sketch of how such an inquirymight proceed, using the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)  as a70case study.  After our discussion of RLUIPA, we conclude with more general observations aboutthe forms and limits of permissive accommodation.A. RLUIPA: Case Study in Permissive AccommodationFollowing the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,  a coalition of71religious and civil rights organizations succeeded in urging passage of the Religious FreedomRestoration Act (RFRA),  which revived, in statutory form, the constitutional standard for72
employer). See text at supra notes XX-XX.69 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.70 494 U.S. 872 (1990).71 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.72 21
mandatory accommodations rejected by the Supreme Court in Smith.  Under RFRA, whichpurports to restate the Court’s pre-Smith standard for free exercise exemptions, if government“substantially burdens” a “sincerely-held” religious belief or practice, the burdened adherent isentitled to exemption from the state action  at issue unless such action is the “least restrictivemeans” of achieving a “compelling government interest.”   In City of Boerne v. Flores,73 74however, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state and localgovernments, because it exceeded Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of theFourteenth Amendment.   After a failed attempt to enact a comprehensive religious75accommodation statute (the Religious Liberty Protection Act ) that would remedy the defects76identified in Boerne, Congress in 2000 passed RLUIPA.   The contexts of land use and77corrections provided the jurisdictional bases that the Court had found lacking in RFRA,  and78avoided conflicts (over sexual orientation and abortion) that had strained the RFRA coalition.79
 Id.73 521 U.S. 507 (1997).74 Id. at 532-34.  Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Boerne, RFRA remains75enforceable against the federal government.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S.418 (2006). Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, 105  Congress, H.R. 4019 and S. 2148.76 th 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq.77 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2), 2000cc-1(b) (listing jurisdictional bases for78statute).  See C. Canady, New Legislation on Religious Liberty, 117 The Christian Century, No.7922, p. 786 (Aug. 2, 2000); 146 Cong. Rec. S7,778-79 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.Reid) ( during the RLUIPA debate, discussing obstacles to enactment of RLPA).  For a widerangle critique of generic religious liberty legislation, see Ira C. Lupu, The Case AgainstCodification of Religious Liberty Legislation, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 565 (1999).22
RLUIPA offers an especially illuminating subject for a case study on permissiveaccommodation, because the statute offers much more robust protection for religious exercisethan the Constitution demands for those activities,  and does so through a variety of standards80that present subtly different issues for evaluation in terms of their potential for requiringconstitutionally impermissible religious judgments.  The statute includes five distinct standardsfor judicial scrutiny of land use restrictions, and one for institutionalized persons.  We firstexamine the four land use provisions that focus on discrimination against religious uses orexclusion of such uses,  then look at the “substantial burden” standard in the land use context,81 82and finally turn to RLUIPA’s application of that standard to claims by institutionalized persons.83Our analysis of RLUIPA in this Part explores only the question of whether the standardsmay require public officials to decide religious questions.  Because it singles out religiousactivity for special protection, however, the statute is also susceptible to claims that itimpermissibly benefits religion or unreasonably burdens third parties.  In Cutter, the SupremeCourt held that RLUIPA § 3 rests on a reasonable legislative judgment that the religious exercise
 Even under pre-Smith Free Exercise jurisprudence, the incarcerated did not enjoy80robust rights of religious accommodation.  O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Religious institutions had only minimal success in claiming exemption from land use regulationsbefore Smith, although courts purported to apply the Sherbert-Yoder standard.  See, e.g.,Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303(6th Cir. 1983).  See generally Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting ReligiousLand Uses After Boerne, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 861, 871-880 (2000) (discussing pre-Smithfederal and state court decisions in land use disputes that involved religious institutions). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b).81 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).82 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).83 23
of institutionalized persons has suffered distinctive burdens, such as discrimination and arbitrarylimitation.   The Court has not yet considered a facial challenge to § 2, but we think it would84similarly conclude that a legislative record of distinctive harms to religious land uses justify thegrant of  special protections for such uses.85With respect to burdens on third parties, Cutter indicated that prison officials and courts,in applying the compelling interest test, should be especially sensitive to such burdens that anaccommodation might impose.  A similar approach by zoning authorities and courts isconstitutionally appropriate in applying the land use provisions of RLUIPA.  When officialsdeviate from otherwise applicable land use criteria in response to claims based on religiousexercise, the normal concerns for the interests of abutters, neighbors, and others in thecommunity affected by land use decisions take on constitutional dimensions.1. RLUIPA Land Use - Discrimination and ExclusionSection 2(b) of RLUIPA  addresses land use restrictions that discriminate against or86exclude religious institutions.  It provides:(1) Equal terms. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulationin a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal termswith a nonreligious assembly or institution.(2) Nondiscrimination. No government shall impose or implement a land useregulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (“RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons84provision ... alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise”). Lower courts have uniformly rejected such challenges to the land use provisions.  See,85e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355-56 (2  Cir. 2007);ndMidrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1235-37 (11  Cir. 2004);  GuruthNanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992-95 (9  Cir. 2006).th 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b).86 24
religion or religious denomination.(3) Exclusions and limits. No government shall impose or implement a land useregulation that-(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or (B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structureswithin a jurisdiction.With the possible exception of section (3)(B), none of the “Discrimination andExclusion” provisions of RLUIPA raise any likelihood of land-use officials or judges decidingreligious questions.  Paragraph (1), which requires no less than  “equal terms” for religiousentities as compared to their secular counterparts, has generated conflicting  interpretations in thelower courts.  Some courts have read into the provision an affirmative defense, which wouldpermit the government to justify unequal treatment of a religious use if such treatment furthered acompelling interest.   Other courts have held that the treatment of a religious assembly or87institution must be measured  against that of a “similarly situated” non-religious assembly orinstitution, not simply any non-religious assembly or institution.   However these interpretive88
 Compare Midrash Sephardi, Inc v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214,1231-32 (11  Cir.87 th2004) (equal terms provision incorporates strict scrutiny standard, permitting affirmativedefense) with Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,268-69 (3  Cir. 2007) (equal terms provision is a strict liability standard and does not permitrdaffirmative defense). River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368-73 (788 thCir. 2010) (equal terms provision requires finding that non-religious use is similarly situated tothe proposed religious use with respect to “accepted zoning criteria”); Lighthouse Institute forEvangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (“a regulation willviolate the Equal Terms provision only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions less wellthan secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose”). The reference to "similarly situated" non-religious entities appears to reflect a judicial intuitionthat Paragraph 2(B)(1) is jurisdictionally founded on an enforcement of rights under the equalprotection clause.  But see Midrash Sephardi, Inc v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230-31(11  Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim that comparison should be limited to “similarly situated” non-threligious uses). 25
issues are resolved, the equal terms provision poses no material risk that courts will be requiredto make religious decisions.  To determine whether a religious assembly or institution has beentreated equally, the zoning authority or court must evaluate the treatment of analogous non-religious uses (whether all assemblies or institutions, or only those that are similarly situated).  89That evaluation will involve only secular questions of land use regulation, such as the need forconditional use permits, limits on the size or types of use, or parking requirements.   If the court90permits an affirmative defense involving countervailing interests, that too will be assessedthrough the exclusively secular reasons that a jurisdiction might offer for unequal treatment of areligious use.91Paragraph (2), which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of religion or religiousdenomination,” tracks the requirements of the constitution, and therefore should be considered aconstitutionally mandatory basis for relief, rather than a permissive accommodation.   If a92
 See Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 605 F.3d 1081,891087-88 (10  Cir. 2010) (applying RLUIPA’s equal terms provision).th Id. (comparison of non-religious and religious use in terms of secular zoning criteria).90 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1235 (assessing weight of city’s interest in unequal91treatment of religious use). By contrast, the equal terms provision seems to offer more expansive protection than92the Free Exercise Clause, because the equal terms provision is triggered by comparably worsetreatment than any relevant secular assembly or institution, even if religious uses are beingtreated just like most other secular assemblies or institutions.  In Smith, the Court said that strictscrutiny would apply to religious burdens created by laws that are not “neutral” or “generallyapplicable” with respect to religion.  494 U.S. 872, 880-81 (1990).  The equal terms provisionextends that protection either (as some courts have held) by eliminating the government’saffirmative defense to a prima facie claim of inequality, or by expanding the scope ofimpermissible unequal treatment beyond what the Constitution requires.  See notes XXX-XXX,supra. 26
jurisdiction burdens or disfavors a religious use because the use is religious, or because the use isby a particular faith, such treatment  would almost certainly violate the Free Exercise Clause.93Whether treated as a mandatory or permissive accommodation, the non-discrimination standarddoes not require courts to resolve religious questions.  Instead, using the ordinary methods andprinciples of equal protection review, a court must ask whether the challenged burden wasimposed impermissibly, because of the religious character of the proposed use, or for permissiblesecular reasons.  The court has no need to consider anything other than the credibility andadequacy of the secular reasons offered to justify the burden.   Likewise, Paragraph (3)(A),94which prohibits the total exclusion of religious assemblies from a particular land use jurisdiction,raises no concern about judicial competence to make religious decisions.   A court can decide95whether a land use regime excludes all religious assemblies without resolving any religiousissues. Paragraph (3)(B), the final provision in this part of RLUIPA, protects religious land usesagainst “unreasonable” restrictions.   The indefinite character of this standard may raise distinct96
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (city’s93prohibition of ritual sacrifice, while permitting other forms of slaughtering animals, wasunconstitutional discrimination against religion).  For a comparable exercise of judgment under the equal protection clause in the land use94context, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidatingdenial of special use permit for a group home for mentally retarded persons, because the lack ofcredibility for the City's actions created an inference of impermissible animus toward mentallydisabled persons). As we noted above, the provision may still be vulnerable to Establishment Clause95challenge on other grounds, such as the burden an accommodation may impose on private thirdparties.  RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(3)(B).96 27
issues of government decision-making competence.  In contrast to the first three standards of thisPart, “reasonableness” is not conceptually restricted to secular considerations.   If97reasonableness is determined by reference to the treatment of other religious or secularorganizations, then application of the standard involves the same secular concerns as  the equaltreatment or non-discrimination provisions.   But if reasonableness is not wholly dependent on98such comparison,  and requires an evaluation by land use authorities of  the religious entity’s99reputation, virtue, or social utility , then application of the standard  would be difficult todistinguish from a normative judgment about the value of the faith itself.   This is a judgment100
 See, e.g., Vision Church, Un. Methodist v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 99097(7th Cir. 2006) (“What is reasonable must be determined in light of all the facts, including theactual availability of land and the economics of religious organizations”) (quoting 146 Cong.Rec. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady)).  See also Rocky MountainChristian Church v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 605 F.3d 1081, 1089 (10  Cir. 2010)(InterpretingthRLUIPA’s “unreasonable limit” standard, approved the district court’s jury instruction on thatissue, which“... required RMCC to establish that the County's ‘regulation, as applied orimplemented, has the effect of depriving both [RMCC] and other religious institutions orassemblies of reasonable opportunities to practice their religion, including the use andconstruction of structures, within Boulder County’”). See, e.g., Chabad of Nova v. City of Cooper City, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1289-91 (S.D.98Fla. 2008) (applying “unreasonable limit” standard under RLUIPA). See, e.g., Rocky Mtn. Christian Church v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 605 F.3d 1081,991089-90 (10  Cir. 2010) (applying unreasonable limitations standard).  This section of RLUIPAthhas generated very little decisional law, which suggests that lawyers and judges tend to see it asredundant of the other sections. The meaning of the reasonableness standard should be constrained by its sole100jurisdictional basis, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Seen in that light, the standardwould need to be closely tethered to specific constitutional violations, such as completearbitrariness in application of the relevant zoning criterion, or discrimination – such as that basedon race, sex, ancestry, or religion – that would independently violate the Constitution.  City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (Congress has the power under Section 5 toremedy constitutional violations, but not to create new substantive rights).28
that the Constitution puts off-limits to the state, but it also seems independently barred by theproscription in Paragraph 2 against discrimination on the basis of religion, so there seems littlelikelihood that courts will interpret Paragraph 3(B) to authorize such an inquiry.  Accordingly,judicial application of the “Discrimination and Exclusion” provisions of RLUIPA has remainedwithin a constitutionally safe ambit of decision.2. RLUIPA Land Use - Substantial BurdenSection 2(a) of RLUIPA applies the Sherbert-Yoder standard of strict scrutiny to land usedecisions involving religious entities.  The section provides:  101(1) General rule. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulationin a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of aperson, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the governmentdemonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, orinstitution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compellinggovernmental interest.As we discussed in the first part of this paper, the Sherbert-Yoder standard necessarilyinvolves official judgments about religion.   Some of those judgments are ordinary secular102determinations, albeit in a religious context, such as the claimant’s sincerity.   But other103
 42 USCS § 2000cc(a)(1).101 See text at supra notes XX-XX.102 We do not mean to suggest that inquiries into a claimant’s sincerity are without their103own complications.  But those complications do not include substantive consideration of thebeliefs held.  See U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (discussing sincerity standard);Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2  Cir. 1984) (sincerity, but not substance of religiousndbelief, is within competence of government).  See generally, Kent Greenawalt, 1 Religion and theConstitution: Free Exercise and Fairness 109-23 (2006) (discussing sincerity standard in freeexercise litigation). 29
judgments are not just about religion.  They are religious judgments about the meaning orrelative significance of beliefs or practices within a particular tradition – such as the duty toperform acts of charity,  or the need for particular architectural features in a house of104worship.   Such religious judgments, we contend, fall outside the secular competence of105government officials.  RLUIPA’s statutory language and the land use context reduce some of therisk that officials will routinely be asked to make religious judgments, but they do not eliminatethat risk.RLUIPA attempts to address this concern, and simultaneously maximize the protectionafforded religious land uses, through an expansive definition of religious exercise.  Mostimportantly, the statute provides that “[t]he term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise ofreligion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”   In addition,106the statute defines religious exercise to include “the use, building, or conversion of real propertyfor the purpose of religious exercise”  – and not merely religious activities that may occur on or107within the real property.  Nonetheless, the statutory definition of religious exercise does not solvethe problem of religious judgments.To begin with, a court still must determine whether a specific activity is religious or non-
 See, e.g., Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp.104538, 544-46 (D.D.C. 1994) (religious obligation to feed the hungry). See, e.g., Martin v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 434 Mass. 141, 149-53 (2001)105(discussing religious meaning of steeple – reversing judgment of trial court that steeple lackedsuch significance). RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).106 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).107 30
religious.  Not all government efforts to define religion are constitutionally problematic becausein many contexts the definition primarily focuses on the government’s regulatory purposes. Ordinary zoning practice provides an especially clear example.  In many jurisdictions, “religioususes” are defined in terms of the typical activities that occur in connection with a place ofworship: regular assembly (often with people arriving in vehicles and accompanying concernsabout traffic and parking), less-intense office use and meetings, and perhaps some residential oreducational use as well.   But RLUIPA’s definition of religion, following the Sherbert-Yoder108standard and RFRA, primarily focuses on the individual believer’s perspective about “religiousexercise,” not the government’s functional definition.   That focus on the believer’s perspective109does not mean complete deference, especially in determining whether a particular system ofbelief is religious.   With respect to the practices of an institution that is undisputedly religious,110however, a court is not likely to have a secular basis for disputing the organization’s sincereclaim that a particular activity has religious significance.   Thus, a court interpreting RLUIPA111
 See, e.g., City of Chicago Zoning Code,  17-17-0103-I, which provides this definition:108“Religious Assembly. Religious services involving public assembly such as customarily occur insynagogues, temples, mosques and churches.”  As Professor Conkle argues in his contribution to this symposium, the Sherbert-Yoder109line adopted a progressively more subjective understanding of religious activity protected by theFree Exercise Clause. [CITE] See, e.g., Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025 (3  Cir. 1025).  See generally Kent110 rdGreenawalt, 1 Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness 124-56 (2006)(discussing the problems of defining religion for constitutional purposes). If, however, the religious entity’s only activity is commercial – leasing the property to111a non-religious user – a court should have no difficulty in concluding that organization has noclaim under RLUIPA.  See Scottish Rite Cathedral Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 156 Cal. App.4th 108 (Cal. App. 2  Dist. 2007).nd 31
should ordinarily accept the claimant’s assertion – if sincere – that a particular activity isreligious, whether that involves feeding the hungry or playing basketball.112In a religious land use dispute, the problem of religious judgment remains even if thejurisdiction concedes the religious character of the activity at issue.  Although the statuteforecloses consideration of whether an activity is central or compulsory within a faith tradition,the statute requires an inquiry into whether the burden is “substantial.”   To assess the113substantiality of a claimed burden on religious exercise, the official needs to understand whatunfettered exercise means, as well as the range of religiously acceptable alternatives to theburdened activity.  The official also must measure the extent to which the challenged regulationimpedes the disputed activity.  Although these issues may be decided on exclusively seculargrounds, nothing on the face of the statute limits adjudication to such considerations.As a practical matter, zoning officials and courts are able to avoid religious judgments inmany land use disputes.  In a common type of those disputes, a religious entity holds property
 See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Peoria, 591 F.3d 531, 535 (7112 thCir. 2009) (operation of a community center and single-room occupancy residential facility isprotected religious activity); Bikur Cholim, Inc., v. Village of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (operation of guest home is religious activity under RLUIPA).  For one exampleof a court that appears to have had no hesitation about deciding which activities of a religiousschool should be considered religious, see Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck,504 F.3d 338, 347-48 (2  Cir. 2007) (approving the district court’s room-by-room assessment ofnduses for proposed building, and indicating that certain uses – gymnasium, offices, residence –would not constitute religious activity).  We think the court’s assurance is based more on itsagreement with the claimant’s own classification of the intended uses than with an objective andcontroverted assessment of which uses are religious. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-888.  In his opinion for the majority,113Justice Scalia reasoned that questions of a belief’s centrality and the substantiality of a burden areidentical.  We think the questions are distinguishable, but they are very closely related.  In somecircumstances the substantiality of a burden on religion may be resolved in secular terms, but thereligious centrality of a belief cannot. 32
that is not approved for religious use, and claims that denial of permission is a substantial burdenunder RLUIPA §2(a).   To measure that burden, courts examine the relevant zoning map and114real estate market to determine whether the claimant had other sites reasonably available andapproved for its desired use.   In principle, that analysis is no different from the inquiry courts115conduct to determine the permissibility of restrictions on siting of adult theaters.   Application116of the test may involve controversial considerations, such as the relevance of the expense ofproperty relative to the claimant’s ability to pay, but the inquiry can be conducted without anyreligious judgments.Such judgments cannot be so easily avoided, however, if a claimant asserts that aparticular site, size, or accessory use is religiously significant.  For example, when a religiouscommunity desires to open a school or social ministry in conjunction with its house of worship,
 See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th114Cir. 2003) (churches alleged that they were substantially burdened by Chicago zoning ordinance). Id. at 761-62 (determining that claimants had adequate opportunities to locate houses115of worship in residential zones).  In this type of dispute, courts will also assess the administrativeprocess followed if the religious institution has been denied a special or conditional use permit,to see whether the conditions imposed are reasonable and what effort the religious institution hasmade to comply with reasonable conditions.  As with the assessment of alternative sites, theassessment of conditions on use (such as alterations to the proposed size, parking, orlandscaping) may be conducted in exclusively secular terms.  See, e.g., Vision Church v. Villageof Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 990-91, 998-99 (7  Cir. 2006); Sts. Constantine and Helen GreekthOrthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 899-900 (7  Cir. 2005).th See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1985) (land use regulation must116leave open reasonable alternative avenues for constitutionally protected speech); Topanga Pressv. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524 (9  Cir. 1993) (applying reasonable alternatives standard).thSee also Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 989 (7  Cir. 2006) (discussingthconstitutional review of adult uses in context of RLUIPA claim); Chabad of Nova v. City ofCooper City,  575 F. Supp.2d 1280, 1288-89 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing adult theater decisions indiscussion of reasonable alternatives standard); Tuttle, supra note XX, at 895-903 (comparingzoning restrictions on religious and adult uses).33
the community may assert not only the religious character of the proposed activity, but thereligious importance of having the activity take place on the same site as its existing place ofworship.   The same question arises when a claimant seeks to expand its existing use, and117argues that a particular scale of activity – for example, a worship service for 500 rather than 200– is religiously important.   In such cases, a court lacks secular criteria for determining whether118the claimed religious exercise has been substantially burdened, because the court cannot measurethe claimant’s religious attachment to a particular place, or the extent to which that attachment(or other religious interests) would be burdened if the community needed to relocate.One solution to this problem, of course, is for courts to accept the claimant’s assertionthat its religious exercise has been substantially harmed.  The evidentiary burden of persuasionwould then shift to the government to demonstrate its interest in imposing that harm – a secularinquiry that avoids any need to consider religious questions.  Congress did not intend to provide,however, and courts have uniformly rejected, that degree of deference to religious land useclaims.   Moreover, that deference would effectively immunize religious uses from many land119
 Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 654-55 (10  Cir.117 th2006) (church denied permission to operate daycare center on church property); Calvary TempleAssembly of God v. City of Marinette, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55500, *28-*29 (W.D. Wisc.2008) (church denied permission to open counseling center adjacent to church property);Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington County, 211 Ore. App. 437; 154 P.3d 759 (Or. App.2007) (church denied permission to locate school on same lot as house of worship). Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 Fed. Appx. 729, 736-11837 (6  Cir. 2007) (church denied permission to locate or expand various ministries on same lot asthhouse of worship). See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Peoria, 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7119 thCir. 2009); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7  Cir.th2003). 34
use regulations, application of which would frequently not survive review under RLUIPA’s strictstandards.  As a number of courts have indicated, such regulatory immunity for religious useswould present quite different problems under the Establishment Clause than the problems wehave focused on in this paper.   If the government accommodates religion in a manner that is120not reasonably tailored to a distinctive burden on religion, the accommodation may be treated asimpermissible government support.121In the alternative, courts might avoid this problem by treating land, including the presentsite of a religious claimant, as relatively fungible, thus permitting the same type of inquiry usedfor disputes about the siting of a religious activity.  If a claimant asserts the religious need toworship, educate, and provide social ministry at one site, the court might simply considerwhether that conjunction or density of uses is available at other suitable locations within therelevant area.   The court can use ordinary secular standards of cost and ability to pay to122examine the reasonable availability of those alternative sites.  If no alternatives are available,however, the courts may be forced to make problematic religious judgments about the quality anddegree of religious harm that the zoning authorities have inflicted.3. RLUIPA - Institutionalized Persons
 See, e.g., River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367,120370 (7  Cir. 2010) (discussing Establishment Clause concern and citing other courts that havethaddressed the same issue). Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).  See also Calvary Temple Assembly of121God v. City of Marinette, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55500,  (W.D. Wisc. 2008) (acknowledgingEstablishment Clause concern, but finding it unnecessary to reach the issue). See, e.g., Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington County, 154 P.3d 759, 766-75 (Or.122App. 2007) (discussing and applying standard for determining substantial burden, focusing onalternative locations at which all proposed uses may be conducted).35
RLUIPA § 3 provides:123(a) General rule. No government shall impose a substantial burden on thereligious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as definedin section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997),even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless thegovernment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compellinggovernmental interest.This provision, too, applies the Sherbert-Yoder test – requiring accommodation ofreligious practice unless refusing accommodation is the least restrictive means to a compellingstate interest – to  claims by individuals residing in a wide variety of government institutions,from hospitals and nursing homes to all types of adult and juvenile correctional facilities.   Our124comments focus on the correctional context, which accounts for virtually all of the many reportedcases applying this provision.   The Supreme Court has twice heard disputes over this part of125RLUIPA.  In Cutter v. Wilkinson,  the Court rejected a state’s claim that the statute, on its face,126violated the Establishment Clause by promoting religion; and in Sossamon v. Texas,  now under127advisement, the Court is considering whether claimants may seek money damages from the statefor violations of the statute.  The Supreme Court has not considered – and, as far as we have been
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.123 See the definition of “institution” in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,12442 U.S.C. § 1997. A recent LEXIS search for reported decisions applying RLUIPA § 3 produced over a125thousand cases. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).126 560 F.3d 316 (2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3319 (2010).127 36
able to determine, no court has squarely addressed – the problem we have identified in this paper. But RLUIPA § 3 presents that problem in its starkest form.  In disputes arising under thisprovision, prison officials and courts routinely make religious judgments.Consider just a few recent examples of litigation under RLUIPA § 3.  In Luke v.Williams,  a court determined that a Wiccan prisoner’s religious exercise was not substantially128burdened by the state’s restriction on his practice of faith outdoors, using a variety of religiousartifacts.  The court reached its decision, in part, because prison officials had consulted with anexpert on Wiccan practice, who opined that practice of the faith did not require what the prisonersought.   In Sayed v. Proffitt,  a court ruled that a Muslim prisoner’s religious exercise was not129 130substantially burdened by the state’s refusal to allow him to perform “full ablution” (a shower)before weekly prayer service.  The court agreed with prison officials, who in turn relied on anauthority on Islam in concluding that partial ablution is an adequate substitute.   In Vigil v.131Jones,  a prisoner claimed to believe in “Judeo-Christianity,” and said that his religious exercise132was substantially burdened by the prison’s designation of him as a Protestant, which prohibited
 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123752 (D. Or., Nov. 19, 2010).128 Id. at *8 (“Defendants also consulted with multiple Wiccan clergy members, one of129whom stated that ‘Wiccan ceremonies are very personal and can be purely meditative; no specialproperty is needed for this.’”) 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109221 (D. Col., Sept. 27, 2010).130 Id. at *17-*20 (including detailed description of religious authority’s explanation of131ablution requirement). 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95104 (D. Col., August 9, 2010).132 37
him from taking part in Jewish worship services.   The court rejected his claim, and held that133Protestant worship gave the claimant “a reasonable opportunity to participate in prison sponsoredceremonies that observe Judeo-Christian values.”134In each of these disputes, a government official concluded that the claimant’s religiousexercise was not substantially burdened, because the claimant had adequate alternative means ofexercise.  The decision about adequacy of alternatives in this context differs markedly from thatdecision in the land use context.  In land use disputes, the reasonableness of alternatives canfrequently be assessed in secular terms – the location, cost, and other particular characteristics ofland.  In prisons, however, the reasonableness is defined entirely in religious terms – whatofficials deem religiously sufficient for the claimant.  Aside from the issue of whether suchjudgments are appropriate under the statute,  the judgments require officials to exercise135religious authority.  Nor can officials avoid the problem by deferring to the judgment of religiousexperts; that simply transfers the same concern to the state’s judgment about who is qualified tospeak as an expert on the claimant’s faith.136The ubiquity of this problem in prison disputes can be explained by the unique
 Id. at *14-*21.133 Id. at *22.134 If the statute incorporates the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise jurisprudence,135the use of religious authority to deny a claim would be in tension with the Court’s decision inThomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1980) (“Intrafaith differences ... are not uncommonamong followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped toresolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses”). See, e.g., Wares v. Simmons, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317-18 (D. Kan. 2007) (officials136relied on rabbis’ determination that certain religious books were not important for the claimant.)38
institutional setting.  As the Court noted in Cutter, “the government exerts a degree of controlunparalleled in civilian society and severely disabling to private religious exercise.”  137Corrections officials may control the possession of sacred texts and objects,  assembly with138other believers,  access to religious leaders and worship experiences,  as well as choices about139 140grooming, attire, and diet.   For the incarcerated, these core elements of religious liberty depend141on government permission.  Exercise of the power to grant or withhold that permission may quiteunderstandably lead deciding officials to a substantive assessment of the religious reasons for therequest.Moreover, the apparent frequency of official religious judgments may also arise from thegovernment’s role as provider of religious experience.  Because of correctional authorities’control, prisoners depend on government to facilitate their religious exercise by providingchaplains, worship space and time, and other aspects of religious life.   Outside the context of142
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-721 (2005).137 Mauwee v. Palmer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131704 (D. Nev., Nov. 29, 2010)138(possession of eagle talon for religious ritual); LaPointe v. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96776(S.D. Ill., September 15, 2010) (rug for prayer). Ahmad v. Thomas, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100866 (S.D.  Tex., Sept. 23, 2010)139(worship services). Young v. Erickson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134606 (E.D. Wis., December 20, 2010)140(access to worship services and religious leader). Sylvian v. Florida Department of Corrections, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115183 (N.D.141Fla., Oct. 29, 2010) (grooming standards); Jones v. Hobbs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105799 (E.D.Ark., Oct. 1, 2010) (vegan meals required by religious beliefs); Reeder v. Hogan, 2010 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 105024 (N.D. N.Y., Sept. 29, 2010) (meals during Ramadan); Miller v. Wilkinson, 2010U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103364 (S.D. Ohio, September 30, 2010) (grooming standards). Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720-21.142 39
prisons – and that of similar institutions – the government’s provision of religious experiencewould certainly violate the Establishment Clause.   Inside those institutions, and subject to143certain limits, the ordinary provision of religious experience constitutes a permissibleaccommodation.   In the government’s delivery of religious services, however, some consumers144inevitably disagree with the quantity, quality, or timing of the services provided.   Indeed, many145RLUIPA claims should be seen in just that light.   Resolution of such complaints – like the146grant of permission to engage in religious exercise – inevitably leads to a substantive discussionof whether the provided services are inadequate.We understand why those conversations about permission or provision lead to anassessment of religious reasons, especially when correctional facilities have easy access toexperts in religious matters.  But understanding does not entail justification.  Prison chaplains
 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203143(1963) (public school-sponsored religious exercises violate the Establishment Clause). The government may facilitate individuals’ access to religious experience, so long as144that experience is voluntary, the accommodation is provided on a religion-neutral basis, and doesnot impose unreasonable burdens on third parties. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (discussingrequirements of government-imposed restriction on religion, neutral availability of theaccommodation, and avoidance of third-party burdens).  See generally, Lupu and Tuttle,Instruments of Accommodation, supra note XX, at 101-116 (discussing Establishment Clausestandards for evaluation of religious accommodations). See, e.g., Oliverez v. Albitre, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128243 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 2010)145(provision of oil for Wiccan ritual), Planker v. Ricci, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116083 (November1, 2010) (worship schedule for Odinist services); Soria v. Nevada Department of Corrections,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116866 (D. Nev., Oct. 19, 2010) (outdoor space and materials to erectsukkah for Jewish ritual).  See, e.g., Green v. Werholtz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102867 (D. Kan., September 28,1462010) (dispute over kosher meals);  Muwwakkil v. Johnson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95143 (WDVA, Sept. 13, 2010) (adequacy of worship schedule, among other claims).40
and other experts play vital roles in helping to identify and meet the religious needs of theincarcerated, and that includes helping prisoners to understand why they perceive the need for aparticular accommodation.  Experts may even have a role in helping prison officials to determinewhether a particular claim reflects a sincerely-held religious belief.  But their expertise in religionshould not be the source of a legal determination that a claimant’s religious burden isinsubstantial.  That religious judgment is outside the competence of state officials – includinggovernment chaplains.This problem could be resolved by judicial creation of an exception from the ban onofficial religious judgments for such judgments in the unique setting of prisons.  Such anexception would constitute an implicit balancing of Establishment Clause norms against generalconcerns for the scope of religious freedom.  Establishment Clause standards, however, do notinclude balancing tests, and for good reason – government lacks religious competence, and itsinterest in prison administration cannot confer that competence.  We much prefer the approachfavored by the Supreme Court in Cutter, which is largely silent on the question of how todetermine the substantiality of a burden, but offers a contextual interpretation of the compellinginterest standard.  Quoting from the legislative history of RLUIPA, the court said that lawmakers“anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with ‘due deference to the experience andexpertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures tomaintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limitedresources.’”   Those are secular standards, and fall squarely within the competence of officials147
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005) (quoting S. Rep. 103-111, p.10147(1993)). 41
and courts.  Permitting prisoners the space to self-declare the substantiality of the burden they areexperiencing on their religious exercise, and simultaneously giving prison officials wideauthority to assert concerns of safety, security, and limited resources as reasons to refuse to makethe requested accommodation, represents the constitutionally appropriate solution to theconstitutional problems – impermissible religious judgments and unreasonable impact on thirdparties – presented by RLUIPA's institutionalized persons provision.ConclusionThis paper suggests some rather precise criteria for the forms and limits of permissivereligious accommodations.  First, as is buttressed by the analogy to surviving forms ofconstitutionally mandatory accommodations, those structures that include both religion and itssecular analogues tend to be on the constitutionally safest ground.  By definition, such structuresdo not constitutionally privilege religion over all other forms of analogous activity.  And, inpractice, such structures typically do not require government decision-makers to decide questionsabout the weight or significance of particular religious beliefs and practices.  The property taxexemption scheme upheld in Walz,  for example, treated property held by religious institutions148in the same way that property held by secular charities was treated.  Such a scheme entails noreligious determinations by government agents, other than accepting as religious thecharacterization of the general purposes of an entity.When accommodations are for religion alone, the constitutional questions frequentlybecome more difficult.  We have not dwelled in this paper on the question of when religion-
 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).148 42
specificity is justified, but courts will and should ask the question.   Beyond the question of149religion-specificity, there remains the problem of constitutionally impermissible religiousquestions.  Some legislative accommodations are well-designed to exclude such questions.  Theexemption of religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination inemployment, for example, solves this problem by including all employees, and not – as Congressoriginally wrote the statute – by exempting only those employees involved in “religiousactivities.”   More subtly, the post-Goldman statutory accommodation for the wearing of150religious apparel in the military is on constitutionally safe ground, because the questions itdelegates to administrators are whether the apparel is neat, conservative, and consistent withmilitary functions,  rather than whether the wearing the apparel is religiously significant or151trivial.  As Part II of this paper reveals, RLUIPA’s anti-discrimination and anti-exclusionprovisions seems similarly well-designed; all can be applied with only secular considerations inmind. The most questionable, religion-specific accommodations are those that require an
 Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (religion-specific sales tax149exemption for books and magazines unconstitutional) with Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding exemption for religious entities from prohibition on religiousdiscrimination in employment) and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding on theirface the institutionalized persons provisions of RLUIPA).   483 U.S. at 332, n.9.150 After the Supreme Court upheld, against free exercise challenge, a restriction on Air151Force personnel wearing non-military headgear, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986),Congress enacted a statutory accommodation, which permits members of the armed forces towear religious apparel while in uniform unless the Secretary of Defense determines that “wearingof the item would interfere with performance of ... military duties; or ... is not neat andconservative.”  10 U.S.C. § 774 (2010). 43
assessment of religious practice – its religious meaning and weight.  In this regard, federalRFRA, state RFRA’s (which typically have a “substantial burden” trigger), and the “substantialburden” provisions of both the land use and institutionalized persons sections of  RLUIPA are allconstitutionally quite troublesome.  Under such schemes, inquiry into questions of religiouscharacter and sincerity of religious belief are permissible, but judgments about the significance ofreligious practice, or about the religious impact of prohibiting such practice, are beyond theauthority of the state.  The Supreme Court has not yet been forced to face the questions raised byaccommodation statutes that call for such determinations, and the lower courts have yet to  perceive the difficulty.  Eventually, some sharp government lawyer will frame this concern, andthe character of these schemes will produce a long-overdue reckoning on the forms and limits ofpermissive accommodations of religion.
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